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Abstract
We present a formalisation of a category of schemes which we call Broadcast-enhanced
Key Predistribution Schemes (BEKPSs). These schemes are suitable for networks with
access to a trusted base station and an authenticated broadcast channel. We demonstrate
that the access to these extra resources allows for the creation of BEKPSs with advantages
over key predistribution schemes such as flexibility and more efficient revocation. There are
many possible ways to implement BEKPSs, and we propose a framework for describing and
analysing them.
In their paper ‘From key predistribution to key redistribution’, Cichon´, Go le¸biewski and
Kuty lowski propose a scheme for ‘redistributing’ keys to a wireless sensor network using a
broadcast channel after an initial key predistribution. We classify this as a BEKPS and
analyse it in that context. We provide simpler proofs of some results from their paper, give a
precise analysis of the resilience of their scheme, and discuss possible modifications. We then
study two scenarios where BEKPSs may be particularly desirable and propose a suitable
family of BEKPSs for each case. We demonstrate that they are practical and efficient to
implement, and our analysis shows their effectiveness in achieving suitable trade-offs between
the conflicting priorities in resource-constrained networks.
1 Introduction
In [10], Cichon´ et al. propose a ‘key-redistribution’ scheme for wireless sensor networks which
makes use of a trusted base station and broadcast channel to distribute and update keys. This
provides benefits over ‘static’ key predistribution schemes which are typically designed for net-
works which do not have access to a broadcast channel or a trusted base station after deployment.
There is a variety of potential applications for such ‘redistribution’ schemes, and accordingly,
many different ways to design them. We therefore propose the category of broadcast-enhanced
key predistribution schemes (BEKPSs), and define a framework for their design and analysis.
We will introduce BEKPSs in this section and suggest motivations for studying them. We be-
gin by introducing the ideas and terminology of two closely related concepts, key predistribution
schemes and broadcast encryption, before defining BEKPSs themselves.
∗Work conducted at Royal Holloway, University of London, funded by EPSRC.
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1.1 Key predistribution schemes
A key predistribution scheme (KPS) is a method for a trusted base station to preload sym-
metric keys onto devices or ‘nodes’ before they are deployed into an environment to create a
network. Key predistribution is a technique particularly suited to resource-constrained envi-
ronments where public key cryptography is infeasible and there is no method for distributing
symmetric keys once the network is operational, in particular for networks where a secure chan-
nel cannot be established between the network and base station after deployment. A major
drawback of KPSs is that once the keys have been predistributed, subsequent key management
operations are challenging to conduct [2]. We will present examples of KPSs in Section 2.1.
1.2 Broadcast encryption
There are many applications where it is possible for a trusted base station to use a broadcast
channel to communicate with nodes during the operational phase of the network. This broad-
cast channel can be used not only to distribute content, but also to conduct key management
operations. Such applications have been widely studied in the context of broadcast encryption.
The first broadcast encryption schemes were given in [1, 15]. A classic example of a broadcast
encryption application is pay-TV systems, where a key predistribution scheme is used to install
keys into set-top boxes during the initialisation phase. The access to content is then managed
by broadcasting the encrypted content along with a key management ‘header’ whose purpose is
to provide an additional key ‘layer’ of content keys. The combined use of the predistributed keys
and content keys defines the set of users which are able to decrypt and hence view the content.
Note that whilst a pair of users may at times share keys, there is no motivation in the design
of the scheme for users to be able to communicate with each other; the purpose of a broadcast
encryption scheme is to control access to content.
1.3 Broadcast-enchanced key predistribution
We define a broadcast-enhanced key predistribution scheme (BEKPS ) to be a key distribution
scheme designed for a network where a trusted base station and an authenticated broadcast
channel will be available. The availability of such a broadcast channel has been discussed
in [10, 20]. We distinguish between the underlying keys which are predistributed to the nodes,
and the temporal keys which are broadcast by the base station and which the nodes may use
for communication until the next broadcast. The base station broadcasts the temporal keys
by encrypting them using underlying keys, as we will describe in Section 2. Notice that the
broadcasts are made from the base station to the nodes; we do not require the nodes themselves
to be able to make network-wide broadcasts.
Broadcast encryption can be regarded as a type of BEKPS, but with fundamentally different
design goals: in broadcast encryption, temporal key sharing between nodes is incidental. In this
paper we consider BEKPSs for applications where communication between nodes is important,
for example in networks of data-gathering nodes, and so temporal key sharing is one of the
primary design goals. Such differences of purpose create substantial differences between the
designs of typical broadcast encryption schemes and BEKPSs; in Section 4 we see how a na¨ıve
approach to designing a BEKPS from a logical key hierarchy (LKH) broadcast encryption scheme
(Section 4.1) would not provide sufficient resilience.
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There are several advantages of deploying broadcast-enhanced key predistribution as opposed
to the use of a basic KPS:
• Flexibility: In any deployed network, underlying keys may be allocated in a way which
is undesirable, either because there was a lack of control over the initial deployment, or
because the purpose or priorities of the network have changed over time. For example,
as node batteries become drained, it may be desirable to reduce the burdens on remain-
ing nodes by distributing fewer temporal keys and maintaining a connected network. A
BEKPS enables the base station flexibility to ensure that some undesirable properties of
the underlying key predistribution do not persist in the temporal key distribution. This
is clear when we consider that the number of temporal keys shared by two nodes can
be greater than, equal to, or less than the number of underlying keys which they share.
Changes may be temporary, and hence only effective between a small number of updates,
or permenantly sustained by future updates.
• Ease of revocation: In any BEKPS it is possible to revoke a node by ensuring it does
not receive any future temporal keys. This can be done simply by omitting that node’s
underlying keys from the set of underlying keys used to encrypt all future temporal key
broadcasts. This straightforward approach benefits from reducing the base station’s future
broadcast load. However, it has the potential to reduce the connectivity and resilience of
the remaining network (we define these terms in Section 2), and repeated revocations
may lead to rapid degeneration of the remaining network [10]. In Section 4 we discuss
a practical way to design a BEKPS for efficient revocation, where repeated revocations
increase the broadcast load but do not lead to network degeneration.
• Creating hierarchy in the temporal key distribution: The distribution of the tem-
poral keys may coincidentally or deliberately feature ‘imbalances’, for example, certain
nodes may store more keys than average. Nodes which store extra keys may be desirable
for efficient routing of information through the network, and indeed KPSs have been pro-
posed for heterogenous networks; see [6, 21] for a brief survey. In homogeneous networks
(where all nodes have identical hardware), having comparatively more keys brings with it
the disadvantages of increased communication burdens and quicker battery drainage. One
way to reduce the damage that this causes to the network is to change at regular intervals
the nodes which are required to store extra keys, as in the election of cluster heads in a
network - see [28].
In any network where some nodes store extra keys, the compromise of such a node will
be more detrimental to the resilience of the network than the compromise of the average
node. In Section 5 we propose a family of BEKPSs which provide the benefits of efficient
routing found in hierarchical networks, whilst frequent temporal key updates reduce the
resilience risks and battery drainage.
In the next section we will see an example of a BEKPS and define the model, setting and
metrics for analysing BEKPSs in more detail. Section 3 provides some simpler versions of proofs
from [10] and discusses modifications of the Cichon´ et al. BEKPS based on defining a suitable
intersection threshold.
We then present two families of BEKPSs designed for particular scenarios: in Section 4
we present BEKPSs designed for efficient revocation of nodes, and in Section 5 we present
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BEKPSs which harness some of the advantages of hierarchical networks in a homogeneous net-
work of nodes. We include these two families of schemes as examples of the many applications of
BEKPSs, to show that practical BEKPSs exist which are efficient to implement, and to demon-
strate that explicit formulae can be derived for the connectivity, resilience, broadcast load and
revocation efficiency, allowing for precise analysis of BEKPSs. We conclude in Section 6 and
present ideas for future work.
2 Framework
In this section we propose the framework for a BEKPS protocol by describing our model and
setting, defining the relevant notation and metrics for our analysis, and providing examples.
First, we briefly revisit key predistribution schemes, introducing notation and examples
which will be referred to throughout the rest of the paper.
2.1 Key predistribution schemes
A KPS is a method for allocating a set of keying materials to each node. In the case of schemes
such as [3, 4], also known as ‘key generation schemes’ or ‘key establishment schemes’, these
materials allow nodes to derive symmetric keys for communication. In the key predistribution
schemes which we consider in this paper, a key pool K of n symmetric keys {K1,K2, . . . ,Kn} is
selected from the space of all possible keys, and each node Ni ∈ {N1, N2, . . . , Nv} is allocated a
subset of keys from the key pool.
The size of the key pool and the number of keys allocated to each node are chosen to supply
a trade-off between the following conflicting metrics:
• Key storage: the number of keys which a node is required to store. It is usually desirable
to minimise key storage.
• Connectivity: a measure of the proportion of nodes which share keys. In common with
many other papers, we will denote connectivity by Pr1, the probability that a randomly
picked pair of nodes are ‘connected’, or ‘form a link’. In many schemes, this is simply
the probability that a randomly picked pair of nodes share a single common key. Some
schemes, an example of which is given in Example 2.2, require a pair of nodes to share
η > 1 keys before they are connected. We generally want to maximise connectivity.
• Resilience: a measure of the network’s ability to withstand node compromise. We cal-
culate resilience by fails, the probability that a link between two uncompromised nodes
Ni, Nj is insecure after s other nodes are compromised. This measure is used in [8, 13],
though the notation fails developed later. For ‘good’ resilience we wish to minimise fails.
The following example is a KPS to which we will frequently refer throughout this paper: the
random key predistribution scheme proposed in the seminal paper by Eschenauer and Gligor
[14].
Example 2.1 (Eschenauer Gligor KPS). Every node is assigned a random σ-subset of keys
chosen from a given pool K of n symmetric keys. That is, each node is allocated exactly σ keys,
chosen independently and uniformly at random from the key pool without replacement. Keys
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are then replaced in the key pool before the next node’s key set is chosen, so that it is possible
for two nodes to share keys. Two nodes Ni and Nj are connected if they have at least one
common key. If they have more than one common key, they should randomly select one of them
to encrypt their communications. The probability of two nodes sharing at least one key is
Pr1 = 1−
(
n−σ
σ
)(
n
σ
) . (1)
The resilience is given by
fails = 1−
(
1− σ
n
)s
(2)
after s nodes have been compromised.
The original paper [14] presents an equivalent expression for (1) using factorials; we use
the binomial coefficient notation for consistency with the majority of the subsequent literature.
Equation (2) is first given in [8]. Proofs of these formulae and further analysis of the resilience
of general random key predistribution schemes is given in [18].
To improve the resilience of the Eschenauer Gligor KPS, we can make use of the fact that
some nodes may share more than one common key. Suppose that Ni and Nj have exactly ω ≥ 1
common keys, say Ki1 , . . . ,Kiω , where i1 < i2 < · · · < iω. Then they can each compute the
same pairwise secret key,
Kij = h(Ki1 ‖ . . . ‖ Kiω ‖ i ‖ j),
using an appropriate public key derivation function h, which has suitable input and output
sizes. Such key derivation functions could be constructed from a secure public hash function,
e.g. SHA-1. This leads to a modification of the Eschenauer Gligor scheme:
Example 2.2 (η-composite scheme). Chan, Perrig and Song [8] propose the η-composite scheme,
a modification of the Eschenauer Gligor scheme. Each pair of nodes may compute a pairwise key
only if they share at least η common keys, where the integer η ≥ 1 is a pre-specified intersection
threshold. Given that two nodes have at least η common keys, they use all their common keys
to compute their pairwise key, by means of an appropriate key derivation function, as described
above. If the size of the key pool is kept constant, this modification will reduce the connectivity
and increase the resilience of the network [18].
The other main approach used for key predistribution is deterministic. There are many
different deterministic KPSs, including those based on combinatorial designs [19, 5], graph
constructions [7], Blom schemes [3], and Reed Solomon codes [27]. See [6, 22, 25] for overviews
and comparisons of these kinds of schemes. As well as providing different trade-offs between
the metrics, deterministic schemes can provide advantages such as more efficient shared key
discovery (defined in Section 2.2).
Recall that a BEKPS is a scheme for the distribution and management of keys in a network.
It can be loosely based upon a KPS, but we will show that the additional available resources of an
online base station and broadcast channel mean that more effective trade-offs may be achieved
by using BEKPS approaches which are substantially different from KPSs. The BEKPSs which
we present and analyse in Sections 4 and 5 are based on the random key predistribution scheme
of Example 2.1, but in principle we could instead have used any KPS. We now define our model
for a BEKPS.
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2.2 BEKPS model
We propose BEKPSs for networks of v nodes, N1, N2, . . . , Nv, a trusted authority that preloads
the underlying keys onto the nodes, and a (not necessarily distinct) trusted base station that
can broadcast to all nodes using a broadcast channel.
A BEKPS protocol is comprised of the following phases:
1. Underlying key predistribution: Each node Ni is allocated a set of underlying keys
from the underlying key pool Kυ = {u1, u2, . . . , un} before deployment. Underlying keys
are solely for the purpose of encrypting and decrypting temporal keys, and should not be
used for node to node communication. Once the nodes are deployed, we assume that the
underlying keys are fixed and cannot be altered by the base station or overwritten by the
nodes. (We justify this assumption by noting that if it were possible to securely supply
nodes with new underlying keys, then the resulting system could simply be considered as
an entirely new BEKPS and analysed within our model.)
2. Temporal key distribution: After the nodes are deployed, the base station broadcasts
temporal keys to them in order for them to communicate. Each node is allocated a set
of temporal keys from a temporal key pool Kτ = {t1, t2, . . . , tm}. The temporal keys are
broadcast to the nodes encrypted by underlying keys, so that a node learns a temporal
key if and only if the temporal key is encrypted by an underlying key known to that node.
3. Shared key discovery: Once the temporal keys have been broadcast, a shared key
discovery protocol such as one of those given in [6, 17, 31] can be used so that each
node establishes the set of other nodes with which it shares keys. As in KPSs, if the
temporal keys are assigned in a way known to all the nodes, then a node Ni can broadcast
information about its identity, its node identifier, from which any node Nj can derive the
list of temporal key identifiers {ID(ti1), ID(ti2), . . . } which correspond to Ni’s temporal
key set {ti1, ti2, . . . }. It then remains for each node to look up whether any of these
temporal keys are also known to them. If temporal keys are not assigned in a deterministic
or publicly known way, then each node has to broadcast its whole list of key identifiers in
order to perform shared key discovery.
All BEKPSs described in this paper use variations on the random KPS of Example 2.1,
so shared key discovery requires all nodes to broadcast their key identifiers, unless the
assignment of keys is made public. Since this does not vary throughout the paper, we will
generally omit a description of this phase when defining our BEKPSs.
4. Temporal key update: A new temporal key pool may be generated and new sets of
temporal keys broadcast as often as desired, according to the constraints of the network.
We now present an example of a BEKPS: the ‘key redistribution’ scheme of Cichon´ et al.
[10].
Example 2.3. Underlying keys are distributed randomly as in an Eschenauer Gligor KPS [14]:
a key pool of underlying keys Kυ = {u1, u2, . . . , un} is generated, and each node is allocated a
random k-subset of Kυ. A temporal key pool Kτ = {t1, t2, . . . , tm} of m = n/c temporal keys is
generated, where c is a small constant. Each temporal key is encrypted using c underlying keys,
and the base station then broadcasts the encrypted temporal keys to the network.
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In general, the choice of which underlying keys should encrypt each temporal key can be
made randomly or deterministically. In the Cichon´ et al. scheme, the underlying keys which
should be used to encrypt each temporal key are chosen in a pseudorandom way. That is, we
take a pseudorandom bijection pi between {1, . . . ,m} × {1, . . . , c} and {1, . . . , n} and encrypt
ti using upi(i,1), . . . , upi(i,c). Presumably, a new pi is chosen before each update. To simplify the
notation, we relabel the underlying keys so that u1 = upi(1,1), u2 = upi(1,2), . . . , un = upi(n/c,c) so
that the first c underlying keys encrypt t1 and so on. Then the base station broadcasts:
Eu1(t1), Eu2(t1), . . . , Euc(t1)
Eu(c+1)(t2), Eu(c+2)(t2), . . . , Eu2c(t2)
...
Eu(n−c)(tn/c), Eu(n−c+1)(tn/c), . . . , Eun(tn/c)
We now describe in more detail the setting for which we design BEKPSs.
2.3 Setting
2.3.1 Communication range
The networks which we consider are comprised of nodes which are static and homogeneous. In
many applications, the nodes will not all be within communication range of each other. To fully
analyse and set the parameters for a particular network, therefore, it is necessary to consider both
the key graph (a representation of the nodes which share keys) and the communication graph
(representing the nodes within communication range of each other). The intersection of these
two graphs indicates the pairs of nodes which can communicate directly and cryptographically
protect their link. However, our contributions in this paper relate to the properties of the
key graph, and so this is where we perform our analysis. Applying our results to a particular
scenario with its corresponding communication graph can be done in the same way as with any
key predistribution scheme; for an example, see [7] where a random geometric graph is used to
model the nodes’ locations.
2.3.2 Adversary model
We assume the existence of a strong adversary who is able to compromise nodes to learn both
temporal and underlying keys, and to keep records of all previous transmissions. It should
be noted that a BEKPS does not provide backwards and forwards security against such an
adversary, that is, exposure of an underlying key reveals all future and past temporal keys. It
would be possible to provide such security against a weaker adversary who was only able to
obtain temporal keys, for example in networks where underlying keys are stored in tamper-
resistant hardware.
We suppose that the adversary compromises each node with equal probability. Notice that
it is credible to imagine an adversary which compromises nodes in a carefully-targetted order so
as to expose the greatest possible number of keys through the smallest number of compromises.
Schemes where a node’s key set is determinable from the node’s identifier (Section 2.2) may be
particularly vulnerable to such an attack. However, the random node compromise model which
we use allows us to compare many different schemes by providing a lower bound on the measure
of resilience fails (Section 2.1). This commonly-used measure provides a way of assessing the
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extent to which each key is re-used throughout the network, and hence measures the expected
benefit to an adversary from randomly compromising s nodes.
Other adversary models may of course be studied for particular scenarios, including those
which consider impersonation, eavesdropping and collusion attacks. However, these tend to
require much larger key storage requirements than is typically practical for large networks [9].
If we assume the use of secure cryptographic primitives, any adversarial attack is fundamentally
concerned with an adversary’s access to keys. Our adversary model and measure of resilience
provide a well-defined way of comparing the vulnerabilities of different schemes’ key allocations.
2.3.3 Resource constraints
As with KPSs, we consider BEKPSs for resource-constrained environments where asymmetric
cryptography is infeasible. If there were no other constraints on resources then it would be
trivial to design a BEKPS with almost any properties:
• If there were no limit to the number of keys a node may store, then every pair of nodes
could share a unique underlying key, or indeed every possible subset of nodes could share a
unique underlying key. This would make it possible to achieve temporal key sharing across
any arbitrary group of nodes, though with the potential for high broadcast requirements.
• If the broadcast size were unlimited, each node could store a single, unique underlying key.
The base station could then individually target nodes when broadcasting temporal keys,
and achieve any desired combination of shared temporal keys amongst the nodes.
However, such high requirements will not always be feasible. Our focus in this paper will be on
BEKPSs for constrained environments such as wireless sensor networks, where key storage and
broadcast capability are limited, and where it is desirable for the longevity of the network to
minimise the communication and computational requirements of the nodes.
2.4 Metrics
As in KPSs, the resource constraints dictate that there is a trade-off to be made between
minimising key storage and maximising connectivity and resilience. For BEKPSs these metrics
need to be defined in a little more detail, and we identify two further metrics to consider.
• Key storage: The number of keys σ which a node is required to store in its memory is
the sum of the number of underlying keys, k, and the number of temporal keys, κ. As in
KPSs, key storage should be minimised. We note that in BEKPSs the number of temporal
keys that a node is required to store is not necessarily constant over time.
• Connectivity: As with KPSs, we measure connectivity by Pr1, the probability that a
randomly picked pair of nodes are connected. That is, the probability that they share at
least η keys, where η is the required number of keys specified by the KPS. It is usually
desirable to maximise Pr1 in BEKPSs. Connectivity in the underlying key predistribution
is not necessarily required.
• Resilience: As with KPSs, resilience is measured by fails, the probability that a temporal
link between two uncompromised nodes Ni, Nj is insecure after s other nodes are com-
promised. In this paper we confine our analysis to the computation of fail1 for the ease of
comparing schemes.
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• Broadcast load: We quantify the number of encrypted temporal keys to be broadcast
by the base station at each update, and consider ways to minimise this broadcast load.
• Revocation efficiency: Since nodes may develop faults and we assume the presence of an
adversary, the ability to revoke keys and/or nodes adds robustness to a network. We will
describe nodes which are to be revoked, that is, nodes suspected to be compromised by an
adversary, displaying irregularites, or otherwise weakening the network, as ‘compromised
nodes’. We will refer to the remaining nodes which (as far as the base station can tell)
have not been compromised and are functioning as they should, as ‘uncompromised’.
We analyse a BEKPS’s capability to revoke compromised nodes by the metrics:
– size of broadcast required to revoke r nodes during a temporal key update
– number of uncompromised nodes which lose keys because of the revocation of r com-
promised nodes
We note that for many subsets of these metrics it is trivial to devise a BEKPS which optimises
them. For example, storage, connectivity and broadcast load can be optimised by all nodes
storing a single underlying key u1, with which a single temporal key t1 is encrypted and broad-
cast. Nodes would be connected with probability Pr1 = 1, but resilience would be minimised
and revocation of a strict subset of nodes would be impossible. Therefore we are interested in
schemes which provide suitable trade-offs between all of these metrics.
3 The BEKPS of Cichon´ et al.
We noted in Section 1 that Cichon´, Go le¸biewski and Kuty lowski present a technique for ‘key
redistribution’ in sensor networks [10], which we classify as a BEKPS. The details of their
scheme are given in Example 2.3. In this section we provide simpler proofs of some of their
results (Section 3.1), refine the estimates for the expected number of shared underlying and
temporal keys between two nodes (Section 3.2) and give a precise analysis of the resilience
(Section 3.3). In Section 3.4 we present some numerical values of our formulae, and finally in
Section 3.5 we discuss a modification to the scheme based on defining a suitable intersection
threshold.
3.1 Simplifying proofs from [Cichon´ et al. 2010]
In this section, we give some simplified proofs of results from [10]. We begin by establishing a
combinatorial framework.
We have noted that each node contains a k-subset of keys from Kυ. The indices of these
keys form a k-subset of X = {1, . . . , n} that we term a block. For the purposes of our analysis,
each node can be identified with the block that is associated with the keys that the node holds;
henceforth we will use the terms ‘node’ and ‘block’ interchangably. Note that every block is a
k-subset of {1, . . . , n} that is chosen independently and uniformly at random from the set of all(
n
k
)
possible k-subsets.
In [10, Theorem 1], formulae are proven for the expected number of shared underlying keys
and the expected number of shared temporal keys for two nodes. The proofs given in [10]
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use some heavy machinery involving generating functions. However, this theorem has a quick,
simple proof based on the linearity of expectation of random variables.
First we consider [10, Theorem 1 (part 2)], which asserts that the expected number of
temporal keys shared by two nodes is nc
(
1− (
n−c
k )
(nk)
)2
. Suppose that G1, . . . , Gn/c partition the
n-set {1, . . . , n} into m = n/c disjoint c-sets. A and B are random blocks. The number of
temporal keys shared by A and B is
ωA,B = |{i : A ∩Gi 6= ∅ and B ∩Gi 6= ∅}|.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n/m, define a random variable X˜i = 1 if A ∩ Gi 6= ∅ and B ∩ Gi 6= ∅, and define
X˜i = 0, otherwise. Let X˜ =
∑n/c
i=1 X˜i. Then X˜ computes ωA,B and E[X˜] is the expected value of
ωA,B. It is obvious that
Pr[A ∩Gi 6= ∅] = Pr[B ∩Gi 6= ∅] = 1−
(
n−c
k
)(
n
k
)
and hence
E[X˜i] = Pr[A ∩Gi 6= ∅ and B ∩Gi 6= ∅] =
(
1−
(
n−c
k
)(
n
k
) )2 .
By linearity of expectation,
E[X˜] =
n
c
(
1−
(
n−c
k
)(
n
k
) )2 , (3)
which proves [10, Theorem 1 (part 2)].
To prove [10, Theorem 1 (part 1)] which states that the expected number of underlying keys
shared between two nodes is k
2
n , we just set c = 1 in the formula derived above. We have
E[number of shared underlying keys] =
n
1
(
1−
(
n−1
k
)(
n
k
) )2 = n(1− n− k
n
)2
=
k2
n
,
which proves the desired result.
3.2 Refining estimates
We have reproved the exact formula for the expected number of shared temporal keys. In [10,
Corollary 1], an estimate for Equation (3) is given when k is roughly
√
n. However, we can also
estimate Equation (3) when k 6= √n.
First, we estimate (
n−c
k
)(
n
k
) ≈ (n− c)k
nk
=
(
1− c
n
)k
,
so
E[X˜] ≈ n
c
(
1−
(
1− c
n
)k)2
.
Next, (
1− c
n
)k ≈ 1− kc
n
+
k2c2
2n2
,
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so
E[X˜] ≈ n
c
(
kc
n
− k
2c2
2n2
)2
=
k2c
n
(
1− kc
2n
)2
.
Finally, if we expand the square and ignore the last term, we get
E[X˜] ≈ k
2c
n
(
1− kc
n
)
. (4)
If k =
√
n, then our estimate (4) is
k2c
n
− k
3c2
n2
=
k2c
n
− c
2
√
n
.
The estimate given in [10] is
k2c
n
+O
(
1√
n
)
.
However, in [10], c is assumed to be fixed and the big-oh hides an unspecified constant that
depends on c. To demonstrate this, we provide some example values of the estimates:
n k c exact E[X˜] estimate (4) estimate from [10]
10000 50 8 1.933 1.920 2.000
10000 50 16 3.718 3.680 4.000
10000 100 8 7.466 7.360 8.000
10000 100 16 13.810 13.440 16.000
10000 150 16 28.876 27.360 36.000
3.3 Refining the calculation of resilience
For the analysis in this section we consider the resilience of the Cichon´ et al. BEKPS during
a single broadcast phase, that is, during a time period where each node’s set of temporal keys
is not updated. Thus we are concerned with the compromise of temporal keys; an adversary’s
knowledge of underlying keys is irrelevant to the analysis.
Cichon´ et al. [10] study the resilience of their BEKPS but they make several simplifying
assumptions. Here we give a much more general analysis and we derive general formulae for
resilience. In [10, Theorem 2], it is assumed that two nodes A and B have exactly c temporal keys
in common. In view of the estimates provided in the last section, this is roughly the expected
number of common temporal keys when k =
√
n. Under this assumption, [10, Theorem 2]
estimates the probability that a random node C contains these c common temporal keys to be
(kc/n)c. We calculate the resilience when k 6= √n.
3.3.1 Temporal key sets
As before, suppose that G1, . . . , Gn/c partition an n-set X = {1, . . . , n} into m = n/c disjoint
c-sets. Suppose A is a random block (i.e., a k-subset of X) and define
I(A) = {i : A ∩Gi 6= ∅}.
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I(A) is the set of indices of the temporal keys held by A. Then let
κA = |I(A)|;
κA is the number of temporal keys held by A.
Fix any i-subset I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}. Define
M(i) = |{A : I(A) = I}|.
Note that M(i) counts the number of possible nodes whose set of temporal keys is equal to I.
The value M(i) does not depend on the particular i-subset I that was chosen.
It is easy to see that
|{A : I(A) ⊆ I}| =
(
ic
k
)
. (5)
We can derive a formula for M(i) from (5) by applying the principle of inclusion-exclusion.
Lemma 1. For i ≥ 1, we have
M(i) =
i−1∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
(i− j)c
k
)(
i
j
)
. (6)
Next, define
N(i) = |{A : κA = i}|.
N(i) is the number of possible nodes holding exactly i temporal keys. The following is an
immediate consequence of (6).
Lemma 2. For i ≥ 1, we have
N(i) =
(
m
i
)
M(i) =
i−1∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
m
i
)(
(i− j)c
k
)(
i
j
)
. (7)
3.3.2 Intersection of two blocks
Next, we consider intersections of two blocks. For ω ≥ 1, define a ω-link to be an ordered pair
of two nodes that contain exactly ω common temporal keys. Let P (ω) denote the number of
possible ω-links; then
P (ω) = |{(A,B) : |I(A) ∩ I(B)| = ω}|.
We have the following formula for P (ω):
Lemma 3. For ω ≥ 1, we have
P (ω) =
k∑
i=ω
k∑
j=ω
(
m− i
j − ω
)(
i
ω
)
N(i)M(j). (8)
For ω = 0, we have
P (0) =
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
(
m− i
j
)
N(i)M(j). (9)
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Proof. Let i = κA and j = κB. We can choose A in N(i) ways. For each choice of A, choose ω
indices in I(A) and choose j−ω indices in {1, . . . ,m}\I(A). Let the set of the j chosen indices
be denoted by J . Then choose B such that I(B) = J ; there are M(j) ways to do this.
Remark 3.1. We can verify the formulae (8) and (9) by checking that the following equations
hold for various values of n, c and k:
k∑
ω=0
P (ω) =
(
n
k
)2
and ∑k
ω=1 ωP (ω)(
n
k
)2 = nc
(
1−
(
n−c
k
)(
n
k
) )2 .
3.3.3 Compromised links and resilience
We can now find expressions for the number of nodes which will compromise a given link, and
derive the formula for fail1. Suppose that (A,B) is a ω-link. Then define
S(ω) = |{C : I(A) ∩ I(B) ⊆ I(C)}|.
S(ω) denotes the number of possible nodes that will compromise the ω-link (A,B), and it does
not depend on the particular choices of A and B.
Lemma 4. For any ω > 0, we have
S(ω) =
k∑
i=ω
(
m− ω
i− ω
)
M(i). (10)
Proof. Let i = κC . Choose i− ω indices in
{1, . . . ,m}\(I(A) ∩ I(B)).
Let J denote the i-set consisting of the i − ω chosen indices along with I(A) ∩ I(B). Then
choose C such that I(C) = J ; there are M(i) ways to do this.
Finally, define
T (ω) = |{(A,B,C) : |I(A) ∩ I(B)| = ω and I(A) ∩ I(B) ⊆ I(C)}|.
T (ω) counts triples (A,B,C) where (A,B) is a ω-link compromised by C. It is clear, applying
(10), that the following formula holds.
Lemma 5. For any ω > 0, we have
T (ω) = P (ω)S(ω) =
k∑
i=ω
(
m− ω
i− ω
)
M(i)P (ω).
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Now we are in a position to compute some resilience parameters. Recall that the resilience
metric fail1 denotes the probability that a random link (A,B) is compromised by a random node
C.
Theorem 1. The resilience is given by
fail1 =
∑k
ω=1 T (ω)∑k
ω=1 P (ω)
(
n
k
) . (11)
Proof. The total number of possible ω-links with ω ≥ 1 is
k∑
ω=1
P (ω),
so the total number of triples (A,B,C) where (A,B) is a link is
k∑
ω=1
P (ω)
(
n
k
)
.
The total number of triples (A,B,C) where (A,B) is a link and C compromises this link is
k∑
ω=1
T (ω).
The resilience is just the quotient of these two quantities.
Define fail1(ω) to denote the probability that a random ω-link (A,B) is compromised by a
random node C. We have the following obvious result.
Lemma 6. For any ω ≥ 1, we have
fail1(ω) =
S(ω)(
n
k
) . (12)
Lemma 6 provides another way to derive the formula (11) for fail1. Let λω denote the
probability that a random link is a ω-link. It is clear that
λω =
P (ω)∑k
i=1 P (i)
(13)
and
fail1 =
k∑
ω=1
λωfail1(ω). (14)
Then, from (12), (13) and (14), we have
fail1 =
k∑
ω=1
λωfail1(ω)
=
k∑
ω=1
P (ω)S(ω)∑k
i=1 P (i)
(
n
k
)
=
∑k
ω=1 T (ω)∑k
ω=1 P (ω)
(
n
k
) ,
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agreeing with (11).
3.4 Numerical examples
We now provide some numerical examples of our formulae. First, we give an example to illustrate
the computation of resilience parameters.
Example 3.1. Suppose n = 1000, c = 4 and k = 31. Then the expected number of temporal
keys shared by a pair of nodes, given by (3), is ω = 3.511857771, which is a bit less than ω = 4.
[10, Theorem 2] estimates fail1(4) by computing the quantity(
kc
n
)c
= 0.0002364213760.
A more accurate estimate for fail1(4) based on the analysis in [10], would be(
m−c
k−c
)(
m
k
) = 0.0001980391200.
However, from (12), the exact value of fail1(4) = 0.0001651542962.
The overall resilience of the scheme determined from (11) is fail1 = 0.01330121549. This is
quite a bit higher than fail1(4), primarily because links consisting of fewer than four temporal
keys (which occur frequently) are compromised with higher probability. This can be seen in the
following tabulation of values λω and fail1(ω):
ω λω fail1(ω)
1 0.08756777557 0.1185218591
2 0.1843995070 0.01364696407
3 0.2407996311 0.001524883082
4 0.2188569817 0.0001651542962
5 0.1472998707 0.00001731603382
6 0.07626527018 0.000001755184555
Our next example considers the effect of varying the parameter k.
Example 3.2. Suppose n = 1000 and c = 4. We compute the values of fail1 for various choices
of k:
k fail1
5 0.01925413575
10 0.03349126556
15 0.03904935504
20 0.03548705708
25 0.02588255435
30 0.01518790238
35 0.007187785428
40 0.002776219702
45 0.0008938567010
50 0.0002464139425
15
It is interesting to observe that fail1 at first increases, and then decreases, as k increases. The
higher values of fail1 for small values of k reflect the fact that the network has fewer links and
the links that do exist are more easily compromised.
Our next example considers the effect of varying the parameter c.
Example 3.3. Suppose n = 1000 and k = 25. We compute the values of fail1 for various choices
of c:
c fail1
2 0.02636458442
3 0.02785890369
4 0.02588255435
5 0.02240961738
6 0.01861362594
7 0.01509874645
8 0.01211001320
9 0.009692483706
10 0.007795858957
The interesting thing to note here is that fail1 decreases as c increases beyond 3, but the decrease
is gradual and not very dramatic.
3.5 Intersection thresholds
We discussed the idea of an intersection threshold in Example 2.2. Basically, as η increases,
resilience increases and connectivity decreases. We now develop formulae for these metrics, that
depend on the intersection threshold of the scheme.
Recall from Section 2.4 that the connectivity of a scheme is measured by computing the
probability Pr1 that a random pair of nodes is connected. The following result gives a formula
for Pr1.
Theorem 2. For a scheme with intersection threshold η, we have that
Pr1 = 1−
∑η−1
i=0 P (i)(
n
k
)2 . (15)
Proof. There are
(
n
k
)2
possible pairs of nodes, of which
∑η−1
i=0 P (i) are not connected.
The formula (11) for resilience is generalised as follows.
Theorem 3. For a scheme with intersection threshold η, the resilience is given by
fail1 =
∑k
ω=η T (ω)∑k
ω=η P (ω)
(
n
k
) . (16)
Proof. The proof is a straightforward modification of the proof of Theorem 1.
We now revisit Example 3.1.
16
Example 3.4. Suppose n = 1000, c = 4 and k = 31, as in Example 3.1. We compute the
connectivity and resilience for various values of η.
η Pr1 fail1
1 0.9809852766 0.01330121549
2 0.8950825780 0.003202999469
3 0.7141893766 0.0005577036219
4 0.4779684839 0.00007970558807
5 0.2632730072 0.00001002335465
The use of an intersection threshold allows a suitable tradeoff between connectivity and
resilience. Observe that resilience increases substantially as η increases; however, connectivity
decreases at the same time. For η > 5, the connectivity is too low to be practical. In this
example, η = 2 or 3 provides a good way to “balance” connectivity and resilience.
4 Revocation
In this section we consider how to design a BEKPS where the highest priority is to be able
to revoke nodes efficiently. Revocation of compromised nodes can be achieved in any BEKPS
simply by avoiding using their underlying keys to encrypt new temporal keys. However, this can
have the undesired effect of reducing the connectivity amongst uncompromised nodes, because
they will receive fewer temporal keys if their underlying keys become disused. In general, it is
possible to recover the level of connectivity Pr1 after revocation by selecting future temporal
keys from a smaller pool, so that each temporal key will be known to a higher proportion of
the nodes. However, this lowers the resilience. We therefore design a BEKPS which enables
the revocation of compromised nodes whilst retaining the connectivity and resilience in the
remaining network, and keeping key storage and broadcast load low.
Clearly, the most precise way to be able to revoke individual nodes without causing any
damage to the rest of the network is to assign a unique underlying key to each node of the
network. If each node is given a single, unique underlying key, then this also has the benefit of
achieving minimum key storage per node. However, an update requires a broadcast of (v − r)κ
temporal keys when r nodes have been revoked, which is infeasibly large for many applications.
If it is not the case that each node stores a unique underlying key, then revocation cannot
be precise: uncompromised nodes will also be increasingly affected as the number of revocations
increases. For example, if each node stores k underlying keys, then when a single node is revoked,
k underlying keys are taken out of use by the base station. We denote this as R(1) = k and
derive a general formula for the number of redundant underlying keys after i revocations, when
underlying keys are distributed using the random KPS of Example 2.1.
Lemma 7. Suppose that each node stores k underlying keys, selected randomly from a key pool
of n underlying keys. Let R(i) denote the expected number of underlying keys removed from use
when i nodes have been revoked. Then,
R(i) = n
(
1−
(
1− k
n
)i)
(17)
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Proof. Let the i nodes which have been revoked be denoted by N1, . . . , Ni. For 1 ≤ j ≤ n define
a random variable
Xj =
{
1 if key kj is known to at least one of N1, . . . , Ni
0 otherwise
and let X =
∑n
j=1Xj . We want to find R(i) = E[X].
The expected value of X1 is E[X1] = 1− Pr[k1 is in none of N1, . . . , Ni], so
E[X1] = 1−
(
1− k
n
)i
.
Linearity of expectation gives E[X] = nE[X1], which gives the result.
This means that an uncompromised node is unintentionally revoked with probability
(R(i)
k
)(
n
k
)
as it can no longer learn any temporal keys in future broadcasts, and so after i ≥ 1 revocations
the network size v(i) is
v(i) = (v − i)
(
1−
(R(i)
k
)(
n
k
) ) , (18)
where v is the original network size.
We propose a BEKPS where precise revocation is possible, that is, v(i) = v − i, and which
provides a choice of trade-offs between key storage and broadcast load which are likely to be
suitable for a wide range of network scenarios. To achieve this, we use LKH schemes (Sec-
tion (4.1)) for the underlying key distribution and random key predistribution for the temporal
keys.
Figure 1 shows the deterioration of the size of the network, v(i) from Equation (18), in
comparison to the straight line (v − i), after i revocations. We see that for a small number
of revocations, i ≤ 0.05v, we have v(i) ≈ v − i. However, there is then a rapid deterioration
in the size of the network for 0.05v ≤ i ≤ 0.2v, by which stage there are very few nodes
remaining in the network. This demonstrates that, if only a small proportion of revocations
are anticipated, a na¨ıve approach using random key distribution for the underlying layer may
be sufficient. However, for larger numbers of revocations, it highlights the importance of our
proposed BEKPS for revocation, where the size of the network is always v−i after i revocations.
4.1 LKH
Logical key hierarchy (LKH) schemes [16, 29, 30] are used in the literature of broadcast encryp-
tion for effective and efficient revocation [26]. Each of the v = 2d−1 nodes is allocated d keys,
one of which is unique, and the other keys are known to 21, 22, . . . , 2d−1 nodes respectively. In
Figure 2 we demonstrate this on a network of v = 16 = 25−1 nodes. Each node stores five keys:
a unique key, a key δi shared with another node, a key γi shared with 3 other nodes, a key βi
shared with 7 other nodes, and the key α known to all nodes. The key known to all nodes is
called the ‘root’ key.
If a message is to be broadcast to all nodes it can be encypted using the root key. If a set of
r nodes is to be revoked, then the message should be broadcast using the smallest set of keys
known only to the v − r uncompromised nodes. The size of a broadcast is then logarithmic in
the size of the network.
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Figure 1: Plot of the deterioration of v(i) (Equation (18)) in comparison to the straight line
(v − i) for an example network of v = 1000 nodes, where n = 1000 and k = 30.
α
β1 β2
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
Figure 2: LKH tree on 16 nodes
4.2 BEKPS for revocation
We use LKH for the underlying layer of our BEKPS because it allows fine-grained revocation with
low key storage and logarithmic broadcast load. Other revocation schemes may also be adapted
to form the underlying layer for specific BEKPS scenarios, however, to prevent our analysis from
becoming unwieldy, we restrict our focus to using LKH as a basis for a BEKPS and varying the
distribution of LKH trees in the underlying layer. For other broadcast encryption or revocation
schemes the analysis will remain broadly similar to that given here, and any benefits they
provide over LKH would likely be reflected in the resulting BEKPS. For example, subset-cover
revocation schemes such as those proposed in [24] require r log v and 2r broadcasts, respectively,
for the revocation of r nodes, whereas LKH requires 2r log v broadcasts. The second of these
schemes also reduces the key storage from log v (as in LKH) to 12 log
2 v, and they additionally
provide traitor tracing mechanisms. It seems likely, therefore, that similar improvements would
19
be reflected in a BEKPS based on these schemes.
In Section 4.2.2 we will define exactly how the temporal keys are distributed. However,
to motivate our choice of underlying key distribution, we note here that before any nodes are
revoked, temporal keys will be broadcast using the root key of the LKH tree. Since the compro-
mise of a node therefore exposes the temporal keys known to all other nodes, we propose using
multiple, smaller trees to lessen this resilience risk. In this way our BEKPS is fundamentally
different from an LKH broadcast encryption scheme, where a single LKH tree is used, but the
base station may broadcast content keys (analogous to temporal keys) to any chosen subset of
nodes.
We propose the following BEKPS for scenarios where revocation is a high priority.
4.2.1 Underlying key predistribution
We assume that for a given application, each node can store σ keys in total, where σ is constant.
To distribute underlying keys, we partition the v nodes into sets of size λ = 2d−1, and we do
this µ times. For ease of analysis, we will assume that λ|v and that these partitions are chosen
such that any tree from partition Πi intersects any tree from partition Πj in at most one node.
Within each set in each partition, nodes are allocated keys according to an LKH scheme,
where the LKH tree has depth d. Thus each node belongs to µ different LKH trees of depth d
and therefore must store k = µd underlying keys, where µ and d are chosen so that k < σ. The
total number of LKH trees is L = µvλ .
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16
T1,1 T1,2 T1,3 T1,4
T2,1
T2,2
T2,3
T2,4
Figure 3: Example of partitioning nodes into L = µvλ trees
Example 4.1. Figure 3 illustrates an example of allocating v = 16 nodes into vλ = 4 trees in
each of µ = 2 partitions. That is, each tree of λ = 4 nodes is represented by a shaded loop around
the nodes; partition Π1 is represented by the vertical loops, and partition Π2 is represented by
the horizontal loops. Each tree has been labelled Ti,j , where i denotes the partition to which
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it belongs, and j denotes the tree number within the partition. There are L = µvλ = 8 trees in
total, and each pair of trees intersects in at most one node.
To construct a partition into µλ trees which fulfills the above conditions will only be possible
for certain values of the parameters v, k, λ and µ. This is a well-studied problem in the
literature on resolvable designs [12, 23]. Briefly, a design is said to be resolvable if the blocks
can be partitioned into µ sets or parallel classes, each of which forms a partition of the set of
points. Thus, a resolvable (v, µλ, µ, λ)−configuration can be used to design our underlying key
predistribution. Resolvable designs have been widely studied; see [11] for existence results and
constructions.
4.2.2 Temporal key distribution
From our assumption that total key storage is constant, it follows that each node can store at
most κ = σ − µd temporal keys. For each of the µ partitions of the nodes, a temporal key pool
Kτi of m keys is generated. We require that these key pools are disjoint, that is Kτi
⋂Kτj = ∅
for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ µ, so that we have µ independent Eschenauer Gligor schemes. Relaxing this
requirement would allow for improvements in connectivity at the cost of decreased resilience.
A random set of temporal keys is allocated to every tree in the following way. For each
partition i and each underlying LKH tree Ti,j belonging to that partition (where 1 ≤ i ≤ µ and
1 ≤ j ≤ vλ), a set of bκµc temporal keys is chosen at random from the key pool Kτi and encrypted
using the underlying root key for Ti,j .
We assume that nodes require only one temporal key in common in order to establish a link,
that is, the intersection threshold is η = 1, and a pair of nodes should use a single key to encrypt
their communications. For ease of analysis, we also create the following rules:
• If two nodes are in the same tree Ti,j in any partition Πi then they will share the set of
temporal keys broadcast to Ti,j . The single temporal key which they use for communication
should be randomly selected from this set. Any other keys which they may coincidentally
share should be ignored (for example, they may share other keys from other partitions.)
Note that there is no ambiguity because it is not possible for two nodes to be in more than
one common tree.
• If two nodes are not in the same tree in any partition, they may form a link if they have
at least one key in common; they should select just one of these keys at random to secure
the link.
For example, we consider the possible connections between pairs of nodes in Figure 3:
• Nodes 1 and 9 both belong to the tree T1,1 in partition Π1. This means that they will
share the set of temporal keys from key pool Kτ1 which are broadcast to tree T1,1. They
must pick one of these keys at random to encrypt their communications.
• Nodes 1 and 11 are not in a common tree in any partition. However, they may have one
or more keys in common if
– the set of keys broadcast to T1,1 has non-empty intersection with the set of keys
broadcast to T1,3,
and/or
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– the set of keys broadcast to T2,1 has non-empty intersection with the set of keys
broadcast to T2,3.
They should pick a single one of these keys at random with which to encrypt their com-
munications.
Notice that if the set of keys broadcast to T2,1 has non-empty intersection with the set of keys
broadcast to T2,3 then nodes 1 and 9 will have keys in common from key pool Kτ2 . However,
they must use a key from key pool Kτ1 to encrypt their communications because they belong to
a common tree in partition Π1.
In summary, if a pair of nodes are in the same tree then they have probability Pr1 = 1
of being connected. If not, the probability of them being connected is proportional to the
Eschenauer Gligor connectivity probability, as we explain below. If these rules were relaxed and
a pair of nodes could use any combination of their shared temporal keys to secure their link, the
connectivity and resilience of the network would increase, and so our analysis produces lower
bounds.
4.2.3 Temporal key update
New temporal keys may be broadcast to the network as often as desired. To revoke a node
Ni, the base station should broadcast new temporal keys as normal to all nodes that are not
in a common tree to Ni. For any nodes that are in a common tree to Ni, the base station
can broadcast new temporal keys encrypted using the smallest set of LKH keys so that all
uncompromised nodes receive the new temporal keys but Ni is unable to decrypt any temporal
keys from the broadcast.
4.3 Analysis
We now perform analysis of this BEKPS for the cases µ = 1 and µ = 2, and consider the effect
of varying d and hence λ, the size of each LKH tree.
4.3.1 LKH trees where µ = 1
We begin by considering µ = 1, that is each node is in exactly 1 tree, and the total number of
LKH trees is L = vλ .
Lemma 8. When µ = 1, the connectivity is given by
Pr1 =
λ− 1
v − 1 .1 +
v − λ
v − 1
(
1−
(m−(σ−d)
σ−d
)(
m
σ−d
) ) .
Proof. Fix a single node Ni, belonging to a single LKH tree Tj (since µ = 1). We consider the
probability of Ni being connected to another of the v − 1 nodes, which fall into two categories:
• Ni will share temporal keys with the other λ− 1 nodes of its tree Tj with probability 1
• Ni will share at least one key with the remaining v− λ nodes with the Eschenauer Gligor
probability given in Example 2.1, and κ = σ − d.
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We now calculate the resilience metric fail1. We must consider the probability of a random
link being compromised when it is a link between nodes of the same tree, and when it is a link
between nodes which are not in a common tree.
Lemma 9. When µ = 1, the resilience is given by
fail1 =
f1
[
λ−2
v−2 .1 +
v−λ
v−2
(
σ−d
m
)]
+ f2
[
2λ−2
v−2 .1 +
v−2λ
v−2
(
σ−d
m
)]
f1 + f2
,
where f1 =
(
λ
2
)
v
λ and f2 =
(
1− (
m−(σ−d)
σ−d )
( mσ−d)
)((
v
2
)− (λ2) vλ).
Proof. There are f1 =
(
λ
2
)
v
λ pairs of nodes in the network where both nodes are in the same
tree. After compromising a single node, the adversary can break a link between one of these
pairs with probability
fail1,f1 =
λ− 2
v − 2 .1 +
v − λ
v − 2
(
σ − d
m
)
,
since for a given link, there are λ− 2 nodes which, if compromised, would break that link with
certainty by virtue of being in the same tree. A compromise of one of the remaining v−λ nodes
would reveal the desired key with probability σ−dm .
The total number of pairs of nodes which are in different trees is
(
v
2
)− (λ2) vλ , and each pair is
connected with the Eschenauer Gligor probability. Therefore we have that the expected number
of links between pairs of nodes from different trees is
f2 =
(
1−
(m−(σ−d)
σ−d
)(
m
σ−d
) )((v
2
)
−
(
λ
2
)
v
λ
)
and for these,
fail1,f2 =
2λ− 2
v − 2 .1 +
v − 2λ
v − 2
(
σ − d
m
)
.
This is because, if we fix a link between uncompromised nodes Ni and Nj from different trees,
there are 2(λ − 1) nodes which are in a common tree with either Ni or Nj and therefore know
their shared key with certainty. This leaves v− 2λ nodes which each have a probability of κm of
knowing their shared key.
Finally, we consider br, the broadcast load required to revoke r nodes. We derive the general
formula here for µ > 0.
Lemma 10. For all µ > 0 and r ≥ 1, the broadcast load to revoke r nodes is given by
br ≤ (σ − µd)
(v
λ
+ rd− 2r
)
.
Proof. We begin by calculating b1, the broadcast load required to revoke a single node Ni. Notice
that Ni belongs to µ trees. Calculating b1 requires the number of Eschenauer Gligor keys per
tree σµ − d, the broadcast to the L− µ trees of uncompromised nodes, and the LKH revocation
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for the µ trees containing the compromised node, which requires d−1 broadcasts per tree. Thus
if the number of nodes per tree is greater than 1,
b1 =
(
σ
µ
− d
)
(L− µ+ µ(d− 1)) = (σ − µd)
(v
λ
+ d− 2
)
.
If the number of nodes per tree is 1 (ie. d = 1) then we assume that µ = 1 so that the number
of trees L equals the number of nodes v. Then b1 = (σ − 1)(L− 1).
The value of br for r > 1 will depend upon whether any of the r nodes are in the same tree(s).
However, we observe that the broadcast load is largest when each of the nodes to be revoked is
in a different tree, hence br ≤
(
σ
µ − d
)
(L− rµ+ rµ(d− 1)) = (σ − µd) ( vλ + rd− 2r).
Figure 4: Plot of the values of Pr1, fail1 and b
′
1 when µ = 1 and there are 1, 2, 2
2, . . . , 28 nodes
per tree for key storage σ = 25, 50 and 100 respectively
We demonstrate these formulae in Figure 4. For comparison, we consider a fixed network
size of v = 1024 nodes, and temporal key pool size of m = 1000 keys. We consider nodes which
can store 25, 50 or 100 keys respectively, and plot the corresponding values of Pr1 and fail1 for
underlying LKH layers of 1, 2, 4, . . . , 256 nodes per tree. In order to plot the broadcast load on
the same axes, we plot b1 as a fraction of the number of keys to be broadcast when there is only
one node per tree (d = 1), ie. we plot b′1 =
b1
(σ−µ)( vλ−1)
.
We see that if nodes can store 100 keys then Pr1 ≈ 1. If nodes can store only 50 or 25
keys then the connectivity decreases significantly, but this has the advantage of lowering fail1.
Finally, we note that the broadcast load b′1 decreases exponentially as the number of nodes per
tree increases. That is, for fixed network size v and key storage σ, the broadcast load can be
decreased by increasing the number of nodes per tree. The plots show that b′1 is almost identical
across different values of σ, however, as we know from the formula, the actual broadcast size b1
does of course increase with σ. For example, when there are 8 nodes per tree, the broadcast
to revoke one node is b1 = 2730 when σ = 25, b1 = 5980 when σ = 50 and b1 = 12480 when
σ = 100.
We make some final remarks to justify the design of our BEKPS for revocation. The plot does
not include the case where there is exactly one underlying LKH tree (λ = v), as in LKH broadcast
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encryption. It is clear from the formulae that whilst the broadcast load would be minimised
and the connectivity maximised, the resilience would be minimised, making it inadvisable for
use as a BEKPS. Whilst a single LKH scheme is appropriate for many broadcast encryption
applications, it is not appropriate for BEKPS because of the different design goals, and the fact
that the base station always broadcasts temporal keys encrypted by the root key (or the smallest
set of keys unknown to revoked nodes). Notice that if this restriction on the base station were
removed and a single LKH tree were used for the underlying layer, this would be similar to
our BEKPS except that nodes would have to store more underlying keys and therefore fewer
temporal keys, restricting connectivity.
4.3.2 LKH trees where µ = 2
We now consider the case where µ = 2, that is, each node is a member of two trees, one from
each partition. Each node therefore stores 2d underlying LKH keys, leaving space for it to store
σ − 2d temporal keys. The base station may broadcast a set of at most bσ2 c − d temporal keys
to each tree. Indeed, in general the base station may broadcast at most bσµc − d to the root of
each tree. For ease of notation we will omit the floor symbols.
Lemma 11. When µ = 2, the connectivity is given by
Pr1 =
2(λ− 1)
v − 1 .1 +
v − 1− 2(λ− 1)
v − 1
1−
(m−(σ2−d)σ2−d )(
m
σ
2
−d
)
2
 .
The proof follows in the same way as that of Lemma 8. The Eschenauer Gligor probability
contains a squared term because the probability of two nodes from different trees not being
connected is the probability of them not sharing any keys from partition Π1 multiplied by the
probability of them not sharing any keys from partition Π2.
Lemma 12. When µ = 2, the resilience is given by
fail1 =
f1
[
λ−2
v−2 .1 +
v−λ
v−2
( σ
2
−d
m
)]
+ f2
[
2λ−2
v−2 .1 +
v−2λ
v−2
( σ
2
−d
m
)]
f1 + f2
,
where f1 =
(
λ
2
)
L and f2 =
1− [(m−(σ2−d)σ2−d )
( mσ
2−d
)
]2((v
2
)
−
(
λ
2
)
L
)
.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 9, we calculate fail1 by considering the two cases:
1. If the link is between two nodes in a common tree in partition Pi, λ− 2 other nodes from
that tree can break the link with probability 1, and v − λ nodes can each break the link
with probability
σ
2
−d
m using their knowledge of keys from the key pool Kτi . There are
f1 =
(
λ
2
)
L such links.
2. If the link is between two nodes which are not in a common tree, 2λ − 2 other nodes in
their respective trees can break the link, and v − 2λ other nodes can break the link with
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probability
σ
2
−d
m . The expected number of such links is
f2 =
1−
(m−(σ2−d)σ2−d )(
m
σ
2
−d
)
2
((v
2
)
−
(
λ
2
)
L
)
.
Figure 5: Plot of the values of Pr1, fail1 and b
′
1 when µ = 2 and there are 1, 2, 2
2, . . . , 28 nodes
per tree for key storage σ = 25, 50 and 100 respectively
In Figure 5 we demonstrate some numerical values using these formulae. As in Figure 4, we
set v = 1024 and m = 1000 for each of the key pools. Again, we see that Pr1 is highest when 100
keys are stored per node, at the cost of a slightly increased value of fail1. Comparing Figures 4
and 5 we find that, when all other variables are fixed, the higher value of µ gives lower values of
Pr1 and fail1, with little effect on b
′
1. For comparison, we note that when there are 8 nodes per
tree, the broadcast to revoke one node is b1 = 2080 when σ = 25, b1 = 5460 when σ = 50 and
b1 = 11960 when σ = 100, that is, a little lower than when µ = 1. We therefore suggest that if
the lower value of Pr1 can be tolerated for the network’s purposes, then µ = 2 should be chosen
to give higher resilience and lower broadcast for revocation.
When µ > 2 the analysis becomes increasingly complex, and it remains an open problem
to determine whether there are any advantages to higher values of µ. It seems likely that as
µ increases Pr1 will decrease, because nodes within the same tree will always be connected
(unless revoked), but nodes which are not in a common tree can only be connected if they know
keys from the same Eschenauer Gligor scheme, of which there are µ different schemes. Since
each node can only store a fixed number of keys σ, as µ increases the number of temporal
keys per Eschenauer Gligor scheme will decrease, and so Pr1 will decrease accordingly. By the
same argument, it seems likely that fail1 would also decrease, giving higher resilience against an
adversary
We have thus constructed an effective BEKPS protocol which allows efficient revocation and
where, given key storage σ, there is some freedom to choose an appropriate trade-off between
the parameters br, Pr1 and fail1, not only by varying the size of the key pool (as with any KPS),
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but also by varying the size λ of LKH trees in the underlying layer, and the number of trees µ
to which each node belongs.
5 Hierarchical temporal key distribution
In Section 1.3 we introduced the idea of using a BEKPS to create hierarchy in the temporal
layer, by broadcasting extra keys to certain nodes. This can provide more efficient routing of
information through a network. The flexibility which a BEKPS provides to change which nodes
have the extra keys reduces both the damage caused by extra battery usage and the risk posed
to the resilience of the network. We will refer to nodes which are allocated extra keys as primary
nodes, whilst the remaining secondary nodes have fewer keys.
Regularly changing the set of nodes that are primary will mean that the burdens of being
a primary node are spread across the network over time. Random allocation of primary nodes
reduces the risk of an adversary launching a targeted attack to reveal a high number of keys
through a small number of node compromises.
5.1 BEKPS for hierarchical temporal key distribution
We now consider the question of how to create a BEKPS so that any node can be chosen as a
primary node, and so that at any time period between broadcasts there should be p primary
nodes and v − p secondary nodes. (Note that the number of primary nodes p may be changed
at any broadcast, so that there are pi primary nodes after update i. However, since each update
can be analysed without reference to the number of primary nodes which have gone before, we
simply write p in the analysis which follows, for ease of notation.)
5.1.1 Underlying key predistribution
We propose that the best choice of KPS for the underlying keys is again one based on a revocation
scheme such as LKH. We justify this with the following observations. Suppose that a node Ni
with underlying key set Ui is to be chosen as a primary node. The base station must broadcast
a higher proportion of temporal keys to it than to secondary nodes.
1. If at least one of the underlying keys in Ui is known uniquely to node Ni, then the base
station can simply use this key to encrypt the extra temporal keys.
2. If none ofNi’s underlying keys is known uniquely toNi, that is, for each uj ∈ Ui there exists
a node Nk with uj ∈ Uk, then in broadcasting extra temporal keys, it will happen that
some other nodes learn some extra temporal keys too. This will have the effect of creating
a multiple-layered hierarchical network, where p nodes are primary nodes but amongst the
remaining v − p nodes there is variety in how many temporal keys are received. Whilst
this may be desirable for some applications, in others it would cause some unnecessary
battery drainage amongst the v− p nodes and complicate routing protocols. We therefore
restrict our study to a strictly two-layer hierarchy of primary and secondary nodes.
We conclude that to efficiently create primary and secondary nodes and avoid unnecessarily
burdening non-primary nodes, it is desirable that each node stores a unique underlying key. For
similar reasons to those given in Section 4.1, we propose an underlying layer based on LKH. As
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in Section 4, using a single LKH scheme minimises broadcast load but maximises underlying key
storage, and so we partition the nodes into several underlying LKH trees, each of size λ = 2d−1.
5.1.2 Temporal key distribution
A straightforward way to allocate temporal keys in order to create p primary nodes is to use a
slight modification of the Eschenauer Gligor KPS [14], where each primary node is allocated κ1
temporal keys and each secondary node is allocated κ2 temporal keys from a key pool Kτ of m
temporal keys. We will demonstrate that this allows the connectivity and resilience parameters
to be easily altered with each broadcast, though of course many other KPSs would be suitable.
For ease of analysis, we choose an intersection threshold of η = 1, that is, two nodes may form
a link if they have one key in common. We will also assume that if two nodes have more than
one key in common then they randomly select one of those keys to secure the link. Relaxing
this assumption would increase the resilience of the scheme.
The choice of primary nodes could be made deterministically or randomly, as desired. The
benefits of choosing them deterministically are:
• more efficient shared key discovery
• the possibility of node identity authentication
• a node will not be required to be a primary node twice until necessary, ie. when all other
nodes have been used as primary nodes at least once.
On the other hand, choosing the primary nodes at random may increase the difficulty for an
adversary to target them for compromise. Given the increased risk to the resilience of the
network which primary nodes cause, the unpredictability of the choice of primary nodes is an
important security consideration. In our analysis we will assume that the adversary compromises
nodes at random, and therefore our analysis is applicable to deterministic and random allocations
of primary nodes.
The base station may choose how to broadcast the temporal keys to secondary nodes in
order to achieve a particular trade-off between connectivity, resilience and broadcast load. We
consider this in more detail in Section 5.2.2.
5.2 Analysis
5.2.1 Connectivity
We now derive formulae for the connectivity probabilities in terms of the size m of the temporal
key pool and the number of temporal keys assigned to primary and secondary nodes, κ1 and κ2
respectively. We use Pr1,1 to denote the probability of two primary nodes being connected, Pr1,2
for the probability of a primary node and secondary node being connected, and finally Pr2,2 for
the connectivity probability between a pair of secondary nodes.
Using the Eschenauer Gligor probability of connectivity given in Example 2.1, we have that
Pr1,1 = 1−
(
m−κ1
κ1
)(
m
κ1
)
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m κ1 κ2 Pr1,1 Pr1,2 Pr2,2
500 50 10 0.9962 0.6548 ≥ 0.1844
500 50 15 0.9962 0.7990 ≥ 0.3709
1000 85 15 0.9996 0.7388 ≥ 0.2041
1000 85 25 0.9996 0.8945 ≥ 0.4731
1000 60 30 0.9783 0.8481 ≥ 0.6045
5000 100 50 0.8701 0.6377 ≥ 0.3965
Table 1: Examples of connectivity parameters (to four decimal places) for different key pool
sizes m and sizes of temporal key pool for primary and secondary nodes, κ1 and κ2 respectively.
and
Pr1,2 = 1−
(
m−κ1
κ2
)(
m
κ2
) .
Similarly, it can be seen that
Pr2,2 ≥ 1−
(
m−κ2
κ2
)(
m
κ2
) .
when we consider that 1−(m−κ2κ2 )/(mκ2) is the probability that two secondary nodes with different
temporal key sets are connected. Two secondary nodes which are given the same set of temporal
keys because they were encrypted with a shared LKH key will certainly be connected, and this
is why a lower bound for Pr2,2 is given. The exact value of Pr2,2 will depend on choices which the
base station makes regarding how to use the LKH tree(s) to distribute the temporal keys, as we
describe in Section 5.2.2. In Section 5.2.3 we derive an estimate for Pr2,2 using an assumption
about the temporal key distribution.
Thus the base station can choose the parameters m, κ1 and κ2 to achieve different levels
of the connectivity probabilities. Some example values are given in Table 1. Observe that
connectivity between secondary nodes may not be necessary or even desirable; for example, to
conserve resources whilst maintaining a connected network, it may be preferable to have a very
low value of Pr2,2 as long as Pr1,2 is high enough to ensure that almost every secondary node is
connected to at least one primary node, and Pr1,1 is high enough to ensure that almost every
primary node is connected to all other primary nodes. Finally, we note that m, κ1 and κ2 are
independent of the network size v, and can be changed at each broadcast if desired.
As with any random KPS, higher connectivity in this BEKPS results in lower resilience.
In particular, the compromise of a primary node will reveal κ1 of the total m keys. This risk
will be reduced by dynamically changing the choice of primary nodes to lower the risk of their
compromise, and by choosing Pr2,2, Pr1,2 and Pr1,1 to be as small as possible whilst retaining
functional connectivity across the network. We calculate fail1 in Section 5.2.3 after considering
the different options available for the base station for the broadcast.
5.2.2 Broadcast load
The following example considers how the temporal keys could be distributed to the secondary
nodes.
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Example 5.1. Suppose we have a network of v = 16 = 25−1 nodes arranged in an LKH tree so
that each node has to store d = 5 keys, as illustrated in Figure 6.
α
β1 β2
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
Figure 6: LKH tree on 16 nodes
Suppose that we wish to create p = 3 primary nodes, and at random we pick these to be nodes
N1, N11 and N12 (underlined in Figure 6). The base station would broadcast κ1 temporal keys
to each of these primary nodes, using their unique underlying keys. For the secondary nodes,
there is a choice to be made about the temporal key broadcast.
1. The key centre could broadcast a separate temporal key set to each of the secondary
nodes using their underlying keys. This creates the maximum broadcast load, the highest
resilience, and Pr2,2 achieves its lower bound:
Pr2,2 = 1−
(
m−κ2
κ2
)(
m
κ2
) .
2. The key centre could minimise the broadcast by using the smallest set of LKH keys not
known to the primary nodes, that is, by using the LKH keys associated with the minimal
covering set of the secondary nodes. In this example, temporal keys would be broadcast
to N5, N6, N7, and N8 encrypted by their shared key γ2; to nodes N3 and N4 using δ2; and
to N2 using its unique underlying key. Similarly, the broadcast to nodes N13, N14, N15 and
N16 would be encrypted by their shared key γ4, and nodes N9 and N10 would be broadcast
temporal keys encrypted by underlying key δ5. The number of temporal key sets to be
broadcast is then reduced from 16 to 8. The probability that a pair of secondary nodes
have at least one common key is then
Pr2,2 =
2
(
4
2
)
+ 2
(
2
2
)
+ (1× 2× 4× 2× 4)
(
1− (
m−κ2
κ2
)
(mκ2)
)
(
13
2
) ,
which is greater than if unique underlying keys were used, at the cost of reduced resilience.
3. In order to find a trade-off between the above options, the key centre could choose not to
use the smallest set of LKH keys unknown to the primary nodes, for example by using the
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six δi keys with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8} \ {1, 6}, plus the unique key known to N2. Then
Pr2,2 =
6
(
2
2
)
+ (1× 12 + 2× (10 + 8 + 6 + 4 + 2))
(
1− (
m−κ2
κ2
)
(mκ2)
)
(
13
2
) .
This example illustrates that there are choices to be made about the broadcast within each
LKH tree, as well as about the number of underlying LKH trees vλ . In our analysis we will
assume that, on average, each set of temporal keys is broadcast to x secondary nodes, where
x < λ and x → λ as p → 0 if the base station is using the minimum broadcast load. Then to
broadcast a set of κ1 temporal keys to each primary node and κ2-sets of keys to each secondary
node requires a broadcast of size
b ≈ κ1p+ κ2 (v − p)
x
.
Using our assumption that each set of temporal keys is broadcast to x secondary nodes,
we can revisit the expression we derived for Pr2,2 and use weighted probability to derive the
estimate
Pr2,2 ≈ x− 1
v − p− 1 +
v − p− x
v − p− 1
(
1−
(
m−κ2
κ2
)(
m
κ2
) ) .
5.2.3 Resilience
We can make an estimate of fail1 using Equation 2 from Section 2 with a weighted probability
for primary and secondary nodes: the expected number of keys known to an adversary after the
compromise of one node is κ1
p
v + κ2
(v−p)
v , and so we have that
fail1,est =
κ1p+ κ2(v − p)
vm
,
since there is exactly one key securing each link. However, this method does not take into
account the proportions of the three different types of links.
We now extend the definition of fail1 to the hierarchical network setting. We retain our
assumption that the adversary compromises all nodes with equal probability, and give each type
of link in the network the same weight. In Table 2 we see comparisons between the approximation
fail1,est and our more detailed calculation of fail1.
Lemma 13. The resilience is given by
fail1 =
1
T
((
p
2
)
Pr1,1fail1,1 + p(v − p)Pr1,2fail1,2+(
v − p
2
)
Pr2,2
[
v − p− x
v − p− 1 fail2,2,a +
x− 1
v − p− 1 fail2,2,b
])
,
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where Pr1,1,Pr1,2 and Pr2,2 are as given above,
fail1,1 =
κ1(p− 2) + κ2(v − p)
m(v − 2) ,
fail1,2 ≈ 1
v − 2
(
κ1(p− 1) + κ2(v − p− x)
m
+ x− 1
)
,
fail2,2,a ≈ 1
v − 2
(
κ1p+ κ2(v − p− 2x)
m
+ 2(x− 1)
)
,
fail2,2,b ≈ 1
v − 2
(
κ1p+ κ2(v − p− x)
m
+ x− 2
)
,
and
T =
(
p
2
)
Pr1,1 + p(v − p)Pr1,2 +
(
v − p
2
)
Pr2,2 .
Proof. We begin by finding the total number of links in the network, before any compromise,
which is
T =
(
p
2
)
Pr1,1 + p(v − p)Pr1,2 +
(
v − p
2
)
Pr2,2 .
Now we consider each type of link and its resilience.
• Primary-primary links
There are
(
p
2
)
Pr1,1 primary node to primary node links. Fix such a link between some
primary nodes Ni and Nj , and consider the advantage to an adversary of compromising a
single node Nk /∈ {Ni, Nj}. If Nk is a primary node, the adversary will learn κ1 keys; if
Nk is secondary it will reveal κ2 keys. Thus the adversary breaks the link with probability
fail1,1 =
1
m
(
κ1
p− 2
v − 2 + κ2
v − p
v − 2
)
=
κ1(p− 2) + κ2(v − p)
m(v − 2) .
• Primary-secondary links
The number of primary node to secondary node links is p(v − p)Pr1,2. Fix such a link
between primary node Ni and secondary node Nj . Suppose that the base station is using
less than the maximum broadcast load. Then the adversary can certainly break the link
if it compromises a secondary node which is ‘near’ to Nj in the LKH tree, such that it
stores the same set of temporal keys as Nj . That is, if we assume that on average, each set
of temporal keys is broadcast to x secondary nodes, then an adversary who compromised
a secondary node Nj will certainly be able to break the p(x − 1) links between primary
nodes and the x− 1 secondary nodes with which Nj shares the underlying LKH key used
for the broadcast. Therefore, we have that a primary-secondary node link is broken with
probability
fail1,2 ≈ 1
v − 2
(
κ1(p− 1) + κ2(v − p− x)
m
+ x− 1
)
,
where the approximation comes from x being an average value.
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x p m κ1 κ2 Pr1,1 Pr1,2 Pr2,2 fail1 b
22 50 500 50 10 0.9962 0.6548 0.1870 0.0290 4875
23 50 500 50 10 0.9962 0.6548 0.1905 0.0357 3687.5
24 50 500 50 10 0.9962 0.6548 0.1973 0.0492 3093.75
23 100 500 50 10 0.9962 0.6548 0.1908 0.0383 6125
23 250 500 50 10 0.9962 0.6548 0.1921 0.0476 13437.5
23 50 1000 50 10 0.9280 0.4027 0.1027 0.0236 3687.5
23 50 500 80 10 0.9999 0.8281 0.1905 0.0384 5187.5
23 50 500 50 20 0.9962 0.8835 0.5683 0.0554 4875
23 50 500 50 30 0.9962 0.9617 0.8536 0.0744 6062.5
Table 2: Examples of connectivity and resilience metrics (to four decimal places) and broadcast
load for fixed network size v = 1000 and varying: the average number of secondary nodes to
which a single temporal key set is sent, x; the number of primary nodes p; the number of keys
in the key pool m; and the number of keys given to primary and secondary nodes, κ1 and κ2
respectively.
• Secondary-secondary links
There are
(
v−p
2
)
Pr2,2 secondary node to secondary node links. Fix such a link between
secondary nodes Ni and Nj . As with primary-secondary links, the adversary can break
the link with certainty if the broadcast load is less than the maximum and the adverary
compromises a secondary node Nk which has received the same temporal key set as one
(or both) of Ni and Nj . Suppose that Ni and Nj have different temporal key sets KNi and
KNj . Then the probability of the link being broken after the compromise of a single node
is
fail2,2,a ≈ 1
v − 2
(
κ1p+ κ2(v − p− 2x)
m
+ 2(x− 1)
)
,
and finally, if KNi = KNj , then the probability of breaking the link is
fail2,2,b ≈ 1
v − 2
(
κ1p+ κ2(v − p− x)
m
+ x− 2
)
.
Combining these results gives the stated formula.
We illustrate some example values of fail1 in Table 2.
We observe that
• increasing x reduces the broadcast load and creates a marginal increase in Pr2,2, leav-
ing the other connectivities unchanged. However, it noticeably increases fail1, that is, it
substantially reduces the resilience.
• for most applications the number of primary nodes need not be large; Pr1,1 and Pr1,2
can be set to be high independently of p, whilst increasing p reduces the resilience and
significantly increases the broadcast load.
• as we would expect, increasing m lowers the connectivity probabilities and fail1, increasing
the resilience. The broadcast load is unaffected.
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• increasing κ2 substantially increases the connectivity Pr2,2, whilst increasing the broadcast
load and reducing the resilience to a lesser extent. It may seem, therefore, that a compara-
tively high value of κ2 will be desirable for most network applications. However, secondary
node to secondary node communication may be unnecessary as long as Pr1,2 is high enough
to ensure that most secondary nodes are connected to at least one primary node. It may
therefore be desirable to keep κ2 very low in order to increase resilience, reduce broadcast
load and conserve battery power in anticipation of secondary nodes becoming primary
nodes in the future.
6 Concluding remarks
We have introduced the term broadcast-enhanced key predistribution schemes (BEKPS) to de-
scribe schemes which combine key predistribution with a trusted base station and broadcast
channel, and discussed some of the many motivations for using BEKPSs. We developed a
framework for the design and analysis of BEKPSs, and demonstrated its use throughout our
paper. In Section 3 we provided simpler proofs for some of the results given by Cichon´ et al. in
[10] for their scheme, which we classify as a BEKPS. We derived more general formulae to cal-
culate the resilience and explained how intersection thresholds can be used to increase resilience
at the cost of decreasing connectivity.
In Sections 4 and 5 we proposed appropriate BEKPS protocols for specific applications. In
Section 4, we demonstrated a practical BEKPS where revocation can be performed without
any uncompromised nodes losing keys. We showed that for a given key storage parameter
σ, suitable trade-offs can be found between the connectivity, resilience and broadcast load by
varying the size of the temporal key pool, and the number and size of LKH trees used to
distribute underlying keys. In Section 5 we demonstrated a BEKPS which creates a network
with two-layer hierarchy. This brings the benefit of more efficient data routing. The ability to
dynamically change the connectivity probabilities and the allocation of primary nodes reduces
the risks of battery drainage and lowered resilience from which other hierarchical networks suffer.
For future work, there are many variations of BEKPSs which can be studied. We note the
following open questions:
• Are there BEKPS scenarios where an underlying key predistribution based on a revocation
scheme is not the best choice?
• Can other revocation schemes provide advantages over LKH in the underlying key predis-
tribution of a BEKPS?
• Are there advantages to assigning temporal keys deterministically (other than aiding
shared key discovery)?
• How can a BEKPS design be adapted to be more efficient if the locations of nodes are
known to the base station?
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